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This article examines why India has opposed a World Trade Oiganization (WTO)
workers' rights clause, and calls for a new way of thinking about international institu-
tions and the link between trade and labor rights. Many labor rights supporters argue that
labor rights principles should be integrated into the WTO, either via the addition of a
workers' rights clause or through a 'judicial" reading of labor rights values into the exist-
ing WTO framework. But India has led a large block of developing countries in opposing
any link between labor rights and the WTO. This opposition has been based primarily on
economic arguments that suggest linkage is motivated by protectionism, concerns about
political sovereignty and neocolonialism, and structural arguments about the proper in-
stitutional roles of the ILO and WTO. These arguments, it is suggested, must be under-
stood in both a contemporary and historical context. In light of this opposition by
developing countries, the article proposes a transition from a WTO-centered view oftrade
and labor linkage to a paradigm based on bilateral and regional market-based agreements
that utilize the ILO-a model that would engage more dynamically with the concerns
presented by India and other stakeholders in the developing world.
INTRODUCTION
Efforts to link workers' rights and trade through a workers' rights clause in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) have, for the foreseeable future, failed.'
*Assistant Professor, Rutgers Business School. J.D. 2002, M.A. (South Asian Studies) 2002,
University of Michigan; B.A. 1994, Oberlin College. I would like to thank Wayne Eastman, Ash-
wini Sukthankar, and the participants of the 13th Annual Conference of the Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies: Globalization and the New Politics of Labor (Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington, February 11-12,2005) for helpful comments on this paper. I would also like
to thank Jayati Lal for comments on an earlier version, and Rohini Hensman for helpful conver-
sations and guidance while conducting research in India. Any errors are, of course, my own.
1. I will use the terms "workers' rights clause" and "social clause" interchangeably. While the
term "social clause" is the preferred term in the Indian context, "workers' rights clause" is more
commonly used in the United States and among labor rights advocates.
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This state of affairs is due in no small part to oppositional efforts by the WTO's
block of developing countries, particularly India, to link trade and labor. Partic-
ularly surprising to Western workers' rights advocates has been the opposition
by stakeholders in some countries of the developing world who might have been
considered natural allies, such as unions and labor rights advocates. Yet scholars
have spent insufficient time either categorizing the underlying arguments for
this opposition or devising new linkage regimes that constructively engage with
and respond to these arguments.
In the trade and labor debate, a new way of thinking about international in-
stitutions and the linkage question is required. Therefore, in this article I use
India as a case study to ask why many developing countries opposed such a
clause, and argue that labor and trade advocates ought to look to non-WTO-
centered trade and labor rights regimes in considering the role of labor rights in
the international trading order. An explicit engagement with these issues is key
if the labor and trade question is to move from a politics of opposition, toward a
politics of the realizable.
In Part I, I provide context to the debate and briefly map out some of the
mechanisms proposed by scholars and activists to link trade and labor rights. In
Part 11, 1 look at the history of India's opposition to the workers' rights clause from
the mid-1990s until just after the Seattle WTO Ministerial in 1999. 1 describe and
categorize the prominent arguments and rhetoric that were used in the public dis-
course on the issue roughly during the time in question, and place them in histor-
ical context. I conclude in Part III by proposing that a new politics of linkage
moves the locus of analysis away from the WTO, and toward bilateral and re-
gional pacts that make use of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to fa-
cilitate incentives-based systems that utilize the market for labor standards.
I. INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS AND THE LINKAGE QUESTION
A. Justificationsfor International Labor Standards
The question of whether to link trade and labor is a subquestion within the
broader debate about international labor standards (ILS). The fundamental ques-
tion that underpins the ILS debate is whether there should be a universally appli-
cable set of labor norms to which all countries should adhere. Contemporary
arguments for ILS and, by extension, trade and labor linkage, are generally
premised on the following justifications: economic, regulatory, and human
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rights.2 Arguments based on economic justifications rest on the notion that free
trade leads to negative welfare outcomes for workers in developed countries who
will lose jobs to workers in the developing world.3 In other words, trade without
universal regulatory ground rules constitutes a form of unfair competition or "social
dumping."4 Regulatory arguments suggest that free trade without international
standards will weaken human rights and labor rights protections in a regulatory
"race-to-the-bottom" in which countries compete with each other for investment by
curtailing workers' rights or weakening labor standards.5 Arguments based on
human rights contend that all workers share universal and inalienable rights, some
of which are specific to the workplace.6 Some scholars have argued that while eco-
nomic and regulatory arguments are not empirically or morally persuasive, human
rights are a compelling reason to link trade and labor rights.
7
2. Michael Trebilcock has categorized these as "unfair competition," "race-to-the-bottom,"
and "human rights." See Michael J. Trebilcock, International Trade and International Labour Stan-
dards: Choosing Objectives, Instruments, and Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS 289, 294-99 (Stefan Griller ed., 2003).
3. See id. at 294-96.
4. Id. at 294. Scholars are particularly skeptical of these arguments on the grounds that they are
not well supported by empirical evidence. See id. at 295 ("There is almost no evidence that the re-
duction in relative earnings of unskilled workers in developed countries that is reasonably attrib-
uted to increased trade with developing countries relates to non-compliance with core labour
standards rather than simply lower wages."); Andrew T. Guzman, Essay, Trade, Labo; Legiti-
macy, 91 CAL. L. REV. 885, 892 n.28 (2003) (citing empirical evidence suggesting that the "feared
wage effect would be small, and perhaps nonexistent"); Robert J. Flanagan, Labor Standards and
International Competitive Advantage, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 15, 16 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003).
5. See Christopher McCrudden & Anne Davies,A Perspectiveon Trade and Labor Rights, 3 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 43,49 (2000) (suggesting that the empirical merits of the race-to-the-bottom arguments are
not definitive); KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE
UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 74 (2003) (arguing that while too much reliance is placed on race-to-the-
bottom arguments by their advocates, globalization enthusiasts too quickly dismiss these arguments
given "the fact that there are trade-related violations of core labor standards"). Contra Guzman,supra
note 4, at 892 n.28 (dismissing race-to-the-bottom arguments as unfounded).
6. James Gross has emphasized the notion that workers' rights are human rights, noting "there is
no compelling reason ... to continue this unrealistic separation of rights that distinguishes between
violations caused by a tyrannical government and violations caused by tyrannical forces in an eco-
nomic system." James A. Gross,A Long Overdue Beginning: The Promotion and Protection of Workers'
Rights as Human Rights, in WORKERS' RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS 1,4 (James A. Gross ed., 2003).
7. See, e.g., Guzman,supm note 4, at 892 ("The more persuasive justification for the use of trade sanc-
tions against countries with poor labor practices is based on the claim that some set of labor rights are
human rights that exist independently of national boundaries."); Trebilcock,supm note 2, at 299 ("[A] link-
age between trade policy and such labour standards is not only defensible but arguably imperative.").
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Defining the substance of these standards is a matter of contention. Some argue
that the ILO's Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work'-in
which four core areas are privileged: freedom of association, regulations on child la-
bor, freedom from discrimination, and freedom from forced labor-ought to form
the core of an international labor rights regime. Others, such as Philip Alston, argue
that the move to core labor standards undermines the larger human rights project
that underpins the ILS movement.9 Indeed, the lack of clarity or agreement on the
contents of ILS leads to difficulties in arriving at a consensus on a linkage regime
among affected countries and stakeholders. For example, it is unclear whether ILS
would mandate material standards that impose costs such as a minimum wage, or
would solely guarantee rights-oriented processes such as freedom of association."°
B. Trade and Labor Linkage
The desire to find a means to encourage adoption and enforcement of labor
standards beyond voluntary, ILO-centered mechanisms has led many ILS pro-
ponents to campaign for linking trading privileges with adherence to ILS." The
linkage debate, as Steve Charnovitz has noted,12 is not a new one, and can be
traced to the beginning of the ILS movement that was launched by European so-
cial reformers in the middle of the nineteenth century. 3
8. INT'L LABOUR ORG., DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK (1998),
available at http'//www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static-jumplvarlanguage=
EN&var-pagename=DECLARATIONTEXT.
9. See Philip Alston & James Heenan, Shrinking the International Labor Code: An Unintended
Consequence of the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work?, 36 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 221,223-24 (2004); Philip Alston, 'Core Labour Standards'and the Tramformation
of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 457, 461 (2004).
10. See McCrudden & Davies, supra note 5, at 51.
11. Scholars have also attempted to grapple more theoretically with the linkage question, seek-
ing, for example, to develop more theoretical frameworks to determine when an issue might be le-
gitimately linked with trade. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 5 (2002);
Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the Entropic Dilemma,
5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 625 (2005) (arguing that to overcome the free trade versus social regulation de-
bate there needs to be a synergistic approach to linkage within the WTO in which a range of insti-
tutional strategies are utilized).
12. Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading Re-
gime:A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L LAB. REV. 565, 565 (1987).
13. John W. Follows, ANTECEDENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 10 (1951); Vir-
ginia A. Leary, Workers Rights and International Trade: the Social Clause (GATE, ILO, NAFTA, U.S.
Laws), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 177 (Robert E. Hudec & Jagdish N. Bhagwati eds., 1996).
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The first legislative linkage between trade and labor came into effect in the
1890s, when the U.S. and British governments unilaterally enacted measures
banning the import of products made with convict labor. 4 Efforts to link trade
and labor within a multilateral framework began as early as the 1940s, when
trade unions in the United States and Britain called for an international treaty
prohibiting the movement of goods made in violation of labor standards such as
the right to organize, the prohibition on child labor, minimum wages, and min-
imum hours of work. 5 The first opportunity to make this a reality materialized
in 1947 during the attempted formation of the International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO), the unrealized precursor to the WTO. The charter of the ITO in-
cluded a clause requiring member countries to "take whatever action may be
appropriate and feasible to eliminate [unfair labor] conditions within its terri-
tory."" The ITO failed, and its eventual successor, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 17 (GATT), contained no explicit provision regarding labor
rights apart from a provision in Article XX, the general exceptions clause, which
permitted restrictions on the importation of goods made with prison labor.'" In
1953, the U.S. government attempted to remedy this perceived labor rights def-
icit by proposing a labor rights provision be made part of GATT, stating that un-
fair labor standards "create difficulties in international trade which nullify or
impair benefits under this Agreement."'9 This attempt failed as well.
1. Unilateral Trade and Labor Measures
While efforts to incorporate a workers' rights clause in the international trad-
ing regime proved fruitless, the United States and European countries responded
by implementing a range of unilateral trade laws that conditioned special trading
benefits upon respect for internationally recognized workers' rights. In addition to
the prohibitions noted above on importation of products made with prison and
forced labor,20 the United States and the European Community (EC) have also in-
14. Charnovitz,supra note 12, at 569-70.
15. Id. at 575.
16. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Mar. 24, 1948, Final Act: Havana
Charterfor an International Trade Organization art. 7, para. 1, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78.
17. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
18. See Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 294-96.
19. Charnovitz, supra note 12, at 574 (quoting U.S. COMM'N ON FOREIGN EcON. PoLicY, STAFF
PAPERS 437-38 (Feb. 1954)).
20. See 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2000).
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cluded labor rights conditionality in their Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) regimes.2' GSP laws are exceptions to WTO nondiscrimination rules, which
permit developed countries to extend preferential and differential treatment to de-
veloping countries. This treatment takes the form of special tariff rates below the
bound rates negotiated in the WTO, which are extended to beneficiary countries.
In addition to the GSP measures, the United States has incorporated labor
rights language similar to that of the GSP into a range of region-specific unilat-
eral trade legislation, including the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the African
Growth and Opportunities Act, and the Andean Trade Preferences Act, as well
as investment guidelines for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
22
India and other developing countries are not enamored with conditionality in
the GSP, however, which reflects their general opposition to linking what they
consider to be nontrade issues with trade legislation. In 2002, India launched an
unsuccessful challenge to the EC's conditionality structure, zeroing in on its re-
quirement that countries effectively enforce antidrug laws. India had originally
also included in its challenge the EC's labor rights and environmental condition-
ality provisions, but later amended its complaint to challenge only the drug provi-
sions. In 2004, the WTO's Appellate Body upheld the legality of the conditionality
regimes, overturning a contrary finding by the dispute settlement panel. 23
21. The U.S. GSP law requires the President, in determining whether to designate any country
as a beneficiary developing country, to take into account "whether or not such country has taken
or is taking steps to afford to workers in that country. . . internationally recognized worker
rights." 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)( 7 ) (2000). "Internationally recognized rights" is defined to include:
"(A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a prohibition on
the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of
children, and a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor... ; and (E) acceptable conditions of
work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health." 19
U.S.C.A. § 2467(4) (West Supp. 2005). For a fuller description of the history of the GSP regime,
see generally Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences:
A 20-Year Review, 22 CoMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 199 (2001).
22. For a critique of these unilateral measures, see Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S.
Trade Law: "Aggressive Unilateralism"?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 71 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F Diamond eds., 1996).
23. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities: Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Pref-
erences to Developing Countries, 190, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004), available at httpI/
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu.e/246abr-e.pdf. For background on the issue and an argu-
ment in favor of the legality of GSP conditionality, see Robert Howse, Indias W/TO Challenge to
Drug Enforcement Conditions in the European Community Generalized System of Preferences:A Little
Known Case with Major Repercussions for "Political" Conditionality in US Trade Policy, 4 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 385 (2003).
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2. Bilateral and Regional Agreements
A turning point in attempts to incorporate a workers' rights clause into the
WTO was the inability at the 1999 WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle to make
any progress on the issue, primarily due to the opposition of India and other de-
veloping countries.24 Since this failure in Seattle, the United States has increas-
ingly negotiated labor rights provisions into bilateral trade agreements with its
trading partners. Congress incorporated language into the U.S. Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002,25 directing the president to negotiate
labor rights provisions directly into bilateral trade agreements. 26 Labor rights
provisions now exist in a number of bilateral agreements including, inter alia,
agreements with Cambodia, 27 Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Bahrain, Argentina,
Australia, Morocco, and several Central American Countries in the form of
CAFTA. 28 Of these agreements, however, only the agreement with Jordan ap-
plies the same set of remedies to labor rights violations as to commercial breaches
of the agreement. The provisions in the other agreements generally require each
trading partner to enforce its own labor laws and forbid nonenforcement of each
other's labor laws in order to gain a trade advantage. 29 One innovative exception
to this model is the agreement with Cambodia, and I will briefly elaborate on
this in Part III.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a regional trade
agreement, includes the now infamous labor side agreement, the North Ameri-
24. See infra Part II.D.
25. Trade Act of 2002 § 2102, 19 U.S.C. § 3802 (2002).
26. The extent to which the president is required to do this, and the form these provisions are to
take, is a matter of debate and is expertly addressed in this volume by Carol Pier. See Carol Pier,
Workers' Rights Provisions in Fast Track Authority, 1974-2007: An Historical Perspective and Current
Analysis, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 77 (2006).
27. See infira note 159 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring, andthe
ILO: Workingto Improve Conditions in Cambodias Garment Factories, 7 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEv. L.J.
79 (2004). The labor rights provisions in the Cambodia agreement, which is specific to the textile
sector, differ substantially from the provisions in the other agreements.
28. Pier, supra note 26.
29. See THOMAS GREVEN, SOCIAL STANDARDS IN BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS: INSTRUMENTS, ENFORCEMENT, AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR TRADE UNIONS 30-31
(Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Dialogue on Globalization Occasional Papers Series No. 16,2005). For
an analysis and critique of U.S. trade policy regarding labor rights provisions in free trade agree-
ments, see Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back-or Vice Versa: Labor Rights Under
Free Trade Agreements fiom NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and Beyond, 37
U.S.F. L. REV. 689 (2003).
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can Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)." The provisions of this side
agreement have come under tremendous critique, and many now agree that its
provisions are too weak, poorly designed, and do not serve as a good model for
linkage."' While a number of complaints were filed by parties using the
NAALC mechanisms, these complaints have largely met with little success.
Some also suggest that these provisions were mostly intended to be a hollow
means to diffuse the labor-activist opposition to trade agreements. As economist
and linkage opponent Robert Stern has noted, "The side-agreement process
might thus be viewed as a convenient political expedient to placate U.S. labor ac-
tivists while at the same time avoiding confrontation with NAFTA partners
over the use of trade sanctions. 3 2
Yet despite their weaknesses in practice, bilateral and regional agreements
have the advantage of being politically negotiated agreements that have the di-
rect consent of their signatories. Because they are negotiated in a specific context,
they provide an opportunity to avoid "one-size-fits-all" solutions to the linkage
question and allow for more varied and experimental approaches to protecting
workers' rights.
3. The WTO
While the United States and, to a lesser extent, the EC have incorporated
labor rights language into unilateral and bilateral trade regimes, efforts to link
trade and labor through a workers' rights clause in the WTO have been unsuc-
cessful. Trade unions have often been at the forefront of these campaigns, and
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) has taken the
30. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) provides for an elabo-
rate mechanism by which the three signatory countries-Canada, the United States, and
Mexico-can file complaints with country contact points to claim that a signatory country had
failed to enforce its own domestic labor law. Each country agrees to "ensure that its labor laws and
regulations provide for high labor standards" and to "strive to improve those standards," referring
to ILO core labor standards and U.S. internationally recognized labor standards. North Ameri-
can Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499. A rather
complex enforcement system is established that provides for consultations between parties, evalu-
ations of the complaint, and, as a final instance, dispute resolution. Id.
31. See generally Weiss,supra note 29, at 701-11.
32. Robert M. Stern, Labor Standards and Trade Agreements 16 (Univ. of Mich. Gerald R. Ford
Sch. of Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 496, 2003),availableat http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/
rsie/workingpapers/Papers476-500/r499.pdf.
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lead on promoting trade and labor linkage. 33 However, as Charnovitz has noted,
these efforts have lacked continuity, each time appearing to be a reinvention of
the wheel.34
If and how labor rights ought to be included in the WTO framework is a
matter of debate. Some argue for a workers' rights clause, i.e., a separate labor
rights provision incorporated directly into the WTO. Chantal Thomas has de-
scribed this as a "legislative" approach to linkage. 31 Unions and labor rights ac-
tivists have been some of the most fervent advocates of the legislative approach,
and the ICFTU, in 1999, published its own workers rights' clause proposal in an-
ticipation of the Seattle Ministerial.36 The ICFTU proposed that the ILO work
dynamically with the WTO to determine whether a country is in violation of
core labor rights. If a violation occurs, an escalating set of punitive measures
might be applied, although these are left intentionally vague. 37 The approach
proposed by the ICFTU exemplifies the model that is most closely associated
with the workers' rights clause in the popular mindset, including in India.
Many scholars, however, are generally skeptical of a legislative approach
and have instead proposed what Thomas terms a "judicial branch approach. ' 8
Advocates of this approach argue that the existing text of the WTO agreements
already potentially permits contracting parties to regulate imports based on
labor rights criteria.39 Proponents, such as Robert Howse, believe, for example,
33. The ICFTU is the preeminent international union federation. Originally formed as a coun-
terweight to the communist World Federation of Trade Unions, it now comprises 233 member-
ship organizations from around the world and is regarded as the international voice of organized
labor. ICFTU Home Page, http//www.icftu.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
34. Charnovitz,supra note 12, at 580.
35. Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization Incorporate Labor and Environmental
Standards?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347,374 (2004).
36. INT'L CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS, BUILDING WORKERS' HUMAN RIGHTS INTO THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (1999), available at http'//www.icftu.org/www/english/els/
esc199BWRGTS.pdf.
37. Id. at 44-46. The only suggested remedy, which is intended as an initial step, is to suspend
the access of countries to the WTO's dispute settlement system. Id. at 46. Interestingly, the ICFTU
downplays the possible implementation of trade related measures by one country against the
other, and emphasizes that its proposal focuses on amending laws, not on imposing trade mea-
sures. Id. How the WTO might implement trade measures, however, is a matter of contention.
The WTO does not impose trade barriers itself, but rather is a forum to agree on rules of the trad-
ing system, and then to adjudicate claims by its contracting members that another contracting
member has violated those rules by implementing an illegal trade barrier.
38. Thomas, supra note 35, at 357.
39. Id. at 357-58.
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that the public morals exception of Article XX of GATT ought to be understood
to include human rights, including core labor rights.4"
Yet others believe that both the legislative and judicial approaches are un-
workable and would opt instead for a politically negotiated solution outside of
the regular WTO framework. Andrew Guzman, for example, has argued that
the WTO ought to create a separate negotiating forum within which interested
contracting members may negotiate special labor rights provisions outside of the
general WTO framework but still have recourse to the WTO's dispute settle-
ment system if desired."
While debates over the relative merits of these different approaches con-
tinue, the reality is that opposition to linkage by developing countries means
there is no possibility in the near future of a workers' rights clause being adopted
by the contracting parties. In order to make progress, scholars and advocates
need to better understand the following question: Why do many of the develop-
ing countries oppose linkage, particularly in the WTO?4 2 Some scholars and
writers have attempted to address arguments put forth by developing countries.
Clyde Summers, for example, has highlighted concerns about protectionism,
sovereignty, and capital flight. While taking issue with these concerns, he also
finds them "not wholly groundless."43
In the next section I seek to gain some insight to this question by using India
as a case study. I will first briefly trace the history of India's opposition to the
workers' rights clause during the mid- to late-1990s, and then analyze and cate-
gorize the arguments underlying India's opposition to a workers' rights clause
while putting them in historical context.
40. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J.
SMALL& EMERGING Bus. L. 131, 142-45 (1999).
41. Guzman,supra note 4, at 888-89.
42. Some scholars and writers have attempted to address arguments put forth by developing
countries. Clyde Summers, for example, has highlighted concerns about protectionism, sover-
eignty, and capital flight. While taking issue with these concerns, he also finds them "not wholly
groundless." Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61, 68-80 (2001). Jose M. Salzar-Xirinachs, a South American diplomat,
also describes some of the main arguments put forth by Latin American and Caribbean countries
opposing trade and labor linkage. These include what he terms "political economy"; "stage of de-
velopment"; the "logic of trade negotiations"; "considerations of efficiency in achieving negotiat-
ing objectives"; and "arguments related to the global architecture of the trading system." Jose M.
Salazar-Xirinachs, The Trade-Labor Nexus: Developing Countries' Perspectives, 3 J. INT'L ECON L.
377, 380 (2000).
43. Summers, supra note 42, at 68-80.
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II. INDIA'S OPPOSITION TO A WORKERS' RIGHTS CLAUSE
A. Forging Domestic Consensus
On January 1, 1995, India celebrated its long awaited entry into the world
trading system by acceding to the newly formed WTO. Bill Jordan, then Gen-
eral Secretary of the ICFTU, marked the event by traveling to New Delhi to win
the support of the government and of his affiliate unions for the ICFFU's cam-
paign to include a workers' rights clause in the WTO.44 To Jordan's dismay, he
was told by union leaders Sanjeev Reddy of the Indian National Trade Union
Congress (INTUC) and Umraol Purohit of the Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS)45
that he should go "talk with the government of India ... [because] It]he employ-
ers, the trade unions, and the Indian government were one on the issue of the
'social clause'." 46
Jordan took the advice of Reddy and Purohit and met with Minister of
Commerce, Pranab Mukherjee, and Minister of State for Labor, P. A. Sangma.
Jordan was told that India would oppose attempts to link trade with labor stan-
dards. 47 Moreover, India intended to organize other developing countries to do
the same.
The somewhat unusual tripartite unity between the government, employ-
ers, and unions that Jordan confronted was officially forged at the Indian gov-
ernment's meeting of the tripartite Standing Labor Committee in September
1994. There, the government put forward a resolution asking for a unified
stance by the government, unions, and employers opposing a workers' rights
clause. The resolution passed unanimously.
4
44. See Saibal Dasgupta, Social Clause Not Acceptable in Any Form, Says India, Bus. STANDARD
(India), Jan. 18, 1995.
45. HMS and INTUC are the only two Indian members of the ICFTU. For a description of In-
dian unions, see INDIAN NAT'L TRADE UNION CONG., TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN THE NEW MIL-
LENNIUM 3 (2000).
46. Saibal Dasgupta, The Stick That Lost Its Sting, Bus. STANDARD (India), Jan. 28, 1995.
47. See GERDA VAN ROOZENDAAL, TRADE UNIONS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE DEBATE ON A SO-
CIAL CLAUSE 137 (2002).
48. Id. at 129. Van Roozendaal reviewed the opposition by Indian unions to a workers' rights
clause and argued that Indian unions uncritically supported the Indian government on this issue
because the trade unions (1) distrust the international community; (2) have a weak domestic politi-
cal position; and (3) were disinterested in workers who might have benefited from a workers'
rights clause, such as those in the informal sector. Id. at 113-14.
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The government had also established, in August 1994, the Commission on
Labour Standards and International Trade chaired by Dr. Subramaniam
Swamy.49 The Commission's mandate was, in part, to evaluate a workers' rights
clause in the WTO and issue recommendations to the Indian government on
what its stance should be. The government clearly did not wish to wait for the
results of this inquiry, however, and forged ahead with its anticlause stance.
In January 1996, the Commission finally issued a report that called upon the
Indian government to adopt a more moderate position on the social clause, seek
international funds to abolish child labor, and forge international consensus on
the matter.5" However, the government never released the controversial report.
Some suspect that this is because the report took a position contrary to the gov-
ernment's position, was criticized in the press, and was criticized by one of its
own members, S.L. Passey of the Congress-Party-affiliated union INTUC, who
published a separate critique of the Commission's conclusions.
51
B. Opposition in Civil Society
However, it was not only unions, government, and employers that were op-
posed to the workers' rights clause. Other influential segments of civil society,
including the media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), also took
strong positions against it.
India's entry into the WTO and the increasing attention paid by the Indian
government to the workers' rights clause issue sparked the media's interest in
the beginning of 1995. Major newspapers around the country began to print a
slew of editorials that, by and large, opposed the workers' rights clause, arguing
that it was motivated by bad faith and was not in the best interests of India. In
Kolkata, The Telegraph ran an editorial entitled "Clause and Fangs," which con-
demned the workers' rights clause as "motivated by simple economic fears:
cheap third world imports flooding the first world in a liberalized global trading
system." 52 The prominent Chennai newspaper, The Hindu, ran an editorial that
49. Id. at 129-31.
50. Id. at 129-30.
51. Id. at 130. The committee chair, Subramaniam Swamy, eventually published his own book
on the WTO and labor rights in which he argues that India might be a net gainer should a social
clause be implemented because labor rights non-compliant competitor countries such as China
would be forced to compete on an equal footing. SUBRAMANIAM SWAMY, INDIA'S LABOUR STAN-
DARDS AND THE WTO FRAMEWORK (2000).
52. Clause and Fangs, THE TELEGRAPH (India), Jan. 23, 1995.
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read, "Here is protectionism in its new garb aiming to strike at the main compet-
itive advantage of the poorer countries, namely, the relatively cheap labour."
53
Perhaps as a means of supporting their opposition to the workers' rights
clause, newspapers made special efforts to favorably report on opposition from
non-Indian sources, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), 4 the U.K.'s Tory government, and the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).?
Arguments in support of a workers' rights clause were generally given less
coverage, and evidence that the impact of a workers' rights clause might not nec-
essarily be to the detriment of India's economy was largely discounted. In April
1995, for example, a preliminary draft of what was to become a well-publicized
report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) suggested that there existed a correlation between levels of respect for
core labor rights enforcement and higher trade flows. 56 The Indian press also re-
ported that the report criticized India's level of respect for labor rights. The
Mumbai-based newspaper, Indian Express, ran an article covering the release of
this preliminary draft and made no secret of its point of view by dismissing the
report's conclusions as being "without evidence.
57
At least one newspaper, however, was not so sanguine about opposing the
social clause. The Business Standard analyzed what would actually substantively
be included in a workers' rights clause and, approaching the issue with a little
more nuance, ran an editorial suggesting that "the advantage of India opposing
the 'social clause' is none too clear except in the obviously contentious area of
minimum wages ... [but] wages are not currently on the agenda."
58
Both labor-oriented NGOs and non-labor-focused NGOs also opposed the
trade and labor linkage, although there was not as much consensus among them
as there was among labor unions. One of the most active NGOs on the issue was
the Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS), a consumer-rights group that
established a trade-policy program in which fighting the social clause was a
53. Protectionism Invading LL..?, THE HINDU (India), Jan. 23,1995, at 15.
54. E.g., Bandar Seri Begawan, Asean Against Linking Trade with Labour Issues, Bus. STANDARD
(India), Aug. 3, 1995.
55. UNCTAD Against Trade, Labour Linkage, THE HINDU (India), Sept. 12, 1995, at 16.
56. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CORE LABOUR STAN-
DARDS 13, 34-36 (1996).
57. Chitra Subramaniam, India Branded Anti-Labour Without Much Evidence at Hand, INDIAN
ExPREss, Apr. 12, 1995.
58. Editorial, Why Fear the Social Clause?, Bus. STANDARD (India), Jan. 23, 1995.
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major policy priority.59 The Center for Education and Communication (CEC), a
prominent NGO that is closely associated with independent unions and re-
searches workers' rights issues, organized in March 1995 a forum on the social
clause with participants from NGOs, trade unions, and academia. The news-
papers reported that, while there was some disagreement between NGOs and
unions on the merits of supporting the social clause, everyone agreed the clause
was motivated by protectionist Western goals, and most believed that it should
be opposed.' In October 1995, the CEC organized a follow-up meeting, in Ban-
galore, to its original conference on the social clause, where it issued another
anti-social-clause statement. As an alternative to trade-related measures, the
CEC advocated a market-based approach, recommending the creation of a na-
tional labor body that could accredit products made in compliance with inter-
national labor standards such that consumers could decide whether or not to
purchase the product.6
Even a representative of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), a
U.N. agency unlikely to take an official position on the matter, was reported (per-
haps misreported) by the Times of India to oppose linkage in an article entitled
"UNICEF Abhors Social Clause Linkage." Stephen Lewis, special representative
of the executive director of UNICEF, was quoted to have said, "The social clause
issue is loaded with so many other motives. The mention of the trade linkage itself
evokes strong reactions in the form of protectionism or neo-colonialism. So how
can international pressure be kept up at the point of the gun ?
6 2
C. Forging International Consensus
While the Indian government was successfully forging consensus between
employers, unions, and the state, and winning the support of civil society, it was
59. For a list of anti-linkage publications by CUTS, see CUTS Centre for International Trade,
Economics & Environment (CITEE), http'//www.cuts-international.org/citee-pub.htm#_Trade-
and-Labour (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
60. See B. S. Nagaraj, NGO', Unions Divided on Linkage of Social Clause to Trade Pacts, INDIAN
EXPRESS, Mar. 24, 1995; Activists Debate Social Clause, MAINSTREAM (India), May 6, 1995, at 11.
61. Labour-Ecologists' Meet Rejects WTO Trade Clause, THE PIONEER (India), Oct. 31, 1995; see
Statement fiom the Second National Consultation on Social Clause in Multilateral Trade Agreements,
Bangalore Consultation on Social Clause in Multilateral Trade Agreements, Bangalore, India,
October 2 7-29, 1995, reprinted in LABOUR, ENVIRONMENT AND GLOBALISATION 181, 182 (J. John &
Anuradha M. Chenoy eds., 1996).
62. Inder Sawhney, UNICEFAbhors Social Clause Linkage, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 24, 1995.
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also organizing opposition to a workers' rights clause among developing nations
in order to defeat it in the WTO. The developing countries had already voiced
opposition to labor and trade conditionality in other forums.6" But the Fifth
Conference of Labor Ministers of Non-Aligned and Other Developing Coun-
tries, which took place in January 1995 in Delhi and was held just after the cre-
ation of the WTO and India's entry into it, provided India with an opportunity
to take a leadership role on the issue. The conference brought together eighty-
five developing countries. India was elected chair, and in keeping with its tradi-
tional leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, other na-
tions looked to it for guidance on the trade and labor issue.' Indeed, India took
a leadership role and helped organize the participants to issue a statement op-
posing trade and linkage. The conference issued a statement known as the
"Delhi Declaration," which proclaimed the conference's unanimous opposition
to a social clause, notably describing the clause as coercive and economically
harmful to the workers it would purport to benefit. The statement reads in part:
We are deeply concerned about the serious post-Marrakech ef-
forts at seeking to establish linkage between international trade
and the enforcement of labor standards through the imposition of
the social clause. [Instead], [a]ction at the national level should be
pursued by each country as considered appropriate to its own
socio-economic conditions without any form of coercion such as
that which the application of the social clause may impose. Such
coercion... also will negate the benefit which the liberalization of
trade is intended to bring about, thus aggravating further at least
in the developing countries the existing problems of unemploy-
ment and distress.65
63. VAN R6OZENDAAL,5SUpia note 47, at 135 (In 1994, "[djuring a meeting of the United Nations
Economic and Social Commission of Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), developing countries agreed
that labour issues should not be linked to trade."). The Fifth Ministerial had also addressed the
issue at its Fourth Conference in Tunis.
64. See generally id. at 114. The G-77 is the largest coalition of developing countries in the
United Nations. Its aim is to promote its collective economic interests and enhance its collective
negotiating capacity within the U.N. system. See Group of Seventy-Seven at the United
Nations--General Information, http://www.g77.org/main/main.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
65. See FIFTH CONFERENCE OF LABOUR MINISTERS OF NON-ALIGNED AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES DRAFT DELHI DECLARATION, DRAFT DELHI DECLARATION art. 5.1-2, reprinted in CENTER FOR ED-
UCATION AND COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL CLAUSE IN MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 161 (1995).
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With this declaration, the labor ministers intended, in the words of one re-
porter, to "destroy the moral underpinnings of the 'social clause' idea which has
enabled Western democracies to sell it to their electorate."
66
After the successful Delhi Conference, the Indian government increased the
intensity of its campaign to recruit other developing countries in opposing the
social clause. At the November 1995, G-15 summit in Buenos Aires, Prime Min-
ister Narasima Rao strongly urged other developing countries to stand united in
opposing a social clause. Instead of a social clause, he argued, they should en-
courage development assistance from the industrialized countries.67
India brought this momentum to the WTO's 1996 Ministerial Conference
in Singapore, where some developed countries, notably the United States and
France, pushed for linking trade and labor standards. 61 Once again, the Indian
press lambasted the attempts by some countries to discuss the labor and trade
connection, with headlines such as "WTO Talks Mired in Peripheral Issues,"
making clear the press's antilinkage position.69 Opposition from developing
countries to the inclusion of labor rights on the agenda culminated in the with-
drawal of an oral invitation to ILO Director General Michael Hansenne to give
a presentation to the Ministerial°.7 Bill Jordan was reportedly not very happy
about this development and accused "vested interests" of keeping out Hansenne
in order to prevent any possibility of giving legitimacy to the idea of linkage. 71 In
a much discussed compromise move, the contracting parties issued a Final decla-
ration supporting international core labor standards, while insisting that the
standards stay out of the domain of the WTO and instead remain in the jurisdic-
tion of the ILO. It read:
We renew our commitment to the observance of international
recognized core labour standards. The International Labour Or-
66. Saibal Dasgupta,Jt Strategy to Scuttle Social Clause, Bus. STANDARD (India), Jan. 23, 1995.
67. PM Asks Developed Nations Not to Pursue Social Clause, Bus. STANDARD (India), Nov. 7,1995;
Kavitha Rao, Third World May Be Stuck with Unrealistic Labour Norns, ECON. TIMES (India), Nov.
20, 1995.
68. Virginia A. Leary, The WTO and the Social Clause: Post-Singapore, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 118, 119
(1997).
69. Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, WTO Talks Mired in Peripheral Issues, EcoN. TIMES (In-
dia), Dec. 12, 1996. But see Tasha Banerjee, Clause and Effect, EcON. TIMES (India), May 31, 1996
(questioning the motives of Indian union opposition).
70. Leary, supra note 68, at 119.
71. V. Jayanth, The Link Between Tradeand Labour Standards, THE HINDU (India), Dec. 7, 1996, at 11.
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ganization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these
standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting
them. We believe that economic growth and development fos-
tered by increased trade and further trade liberalization contrib-
ute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of
labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the
comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage devel-
oping countries, must in no way be put into question. In this re-
gard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue
their existing collaboration.
772
Yet even this language was considered too strong for the South Asian block
of countries. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka opposed the statement, but were
forced in the end to concede, once other countries such as Malaysia accepted it as
a compromise position.73
The next WTO Ministerial Conference, in Geneva, was less contentious, as
labor rights were not prominently on the agenda. But, in response to anti-WTO
protests and world financial crises in Asia and Latin America, then-WTO Di-
rector-General Renato Rugiero made comments that were interpreted by some
to make space within the WTO for labor rights linkage. These included re-
marks that "the WTO needed to 'give answers to issues of very real public con-
, '74
cern,' including 'social conditions' and 'employment'.
D. Winning the Battle in Seattle
It was the 1999 Seattle Ministerial-known as the "Battle in Seattle" due to
the extensive, and occasionally militant, protests by a diverse range of anti-
72. World Trade Org., Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/
DEC/W, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/
min96_e/wtodece.htm.
73. Anjuli Bhargava, India, Pak Forced to Accept Labour Issue Reference, Bus. STANDARD (India),
Dec. 12, 1996. See also Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, India Falls in Line on Labour Norm, In-
vestment Study, EcoN. TIMEs (India), Dec. 13, 1996.
74. See Nigel Haworth, Steve Hughes & Rorden Wilkinson, The International Labour Standards
Regime: A Case Study in Global Standard Setting and Regulation 5 (Bristol Univ. Econ. & Soc. Re-
search Council Future Governance Programme & Univ. of Oxford, Working Paper in Economic
Geography No. WPG 04-10, 2003), available at http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/wpapers/
economic/wpg04-1 0.pdf.
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WTO protestors-that was to become infamous and that marked a turning
point in the social clause debate.
75
One of the Clinton administration's priorities at the meeting was to establish
a working group on core labor standards and trade within the WTO.76 What
particularly irked the developing countries was an apparently off-the-cuff re-
mark in which President Clinton told the press that he would support the use of
trade sanctions if a country violated core human rights. 77 India vehemently op-
posed any effort to create any link between the WTO and labor issues and ac-
cordingly opposed the working group proposal. As at the 1996 Singapore
Ministerial, the Director General of the ILO, now Joan Somavia, had been in-
vited to address participants at the meeting. Once again, India sharply opposed
the invitation, in order not to legitimize the link between labor and the WTO.
7 8
The Indian press continued its antilinkage coverage of the debate with headlines
such as "WTO Talks Mired in Peripheral Issues, '79 and "US Thrusts Labour
Agenda on the Developing World.""°
Despite India's objections to the working group or any other mechanism to
discuss labor rights in the WTO, the WTO posted on its website that the contract-
ing parties nevertheless decided to establish a "working group on labor" chaired
by Costa Rican Vice Minister Anabel Gonzalez.81 The Indian delegation was re-
portedly furious at this development. The delegation still participated in the De-
cember 3, 1999 meeting of the working group, but when asked if a proposal on
labor standards would be acceptable if all other Indian demands were met on
other issues, Minister of Commerce Murasoli Maran conveyed the vehemence of
India's opposition to linkage when he stated, "No, I cannot drink a drop of poi-
son."8 2 Later, Mike Moore, the WTO Director General, claimed that the nomen-
clature "working group" was inaccurate, and that in fact the group was really just
a "sub-group" of the working group that was working on the issues raised at the
75. For an analysis of the Seattle Ministerial, see Summers, supra note 42.
76. David E. Sanger, President Chides World Trade Body in Stormy Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1999, at Al.
77. See David E. Sanger, The Shipwreck in Seattle, N.Y TIMEs, Dec. 5, 1999, at A26.
78. Sheila Mathrani, ILO Chief Heads for Seattle to Explain Labour Issues, EcoN. TIMEs (India),
Nov. 24, 1999.
79. Aiyar,supra note 69. Butsee Banerjee,supra note 69 (arguing India is squandering an oppor-
tunity to level the playing field with other developing countries).
80. US Thrusts Labour Agenda on the Developing World, THE STATESMAN, Dec. 3, 2000.
81. WTO Denies Setting Up Labour Standards Work Group, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 13, 2000.
82. Narendar Pani, Working Group to Study Labour-Trade Link, EcON. TMES (India), Dec. 4, 1999.
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Singapore Ministerial session. Indian officials were not convinced, however, and
were quoted as saying that Moore's clarification was just an "afterthought."83 In-
deed, no working group on labor currently exists in the WTO.
The failure to make any headway in Seattle on trade and labor standards
linkage marked both a severe blow to social clause advocates and, perhaps, a
stinging defeat. The developing countries managed to successfully prevent the
creation of any mechanism within the WTO to discuss labor issues. That accom-
plishment, combined with a newly elected conservative U.S. administration in
2001 that was hostile to linkage, quelled any momentum to include a workers'
rights clause in the WTO. As a result, the social clause debate largely died down
in India after Seattle, although newspapers would still print the occasional edi-
torial and op-ed piece. The WTO Doha Ministerial Conference, in November
2001, notably did not include the social clause issue on the agenda, and the Doha
Declaration only reiterated the 1996 Singapore statement, reaffirming that the
contracting parties would work with the ILO on the social dimensions of global-
ization.84 Effectively, the campaign for a workers' rights clause was dead.
E. The Arguments
85
I have shown that, far from the workers' rights clause being a fractious and
controversial issue within India, there was general consensus against trade and
labor linkage, even among unions and workers' rights advocates. In this section,
I describe and categorize the arguments used by Indian opponents of the work-
ers' rights clause. My core project here is to categorize the arguments so as to aid
scholars and advocates in structuring the way they think about linkage. While I
do not directly critique the merits of each of the arguments, partial critiques will
emerge as I put the arguments into political and historical context. Additionally,
83. See No'Role for NGOs in Dispute Settlement, Says Moore, THE PIONEER, Jan. 13,2000.
84. See World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/
1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at http-//www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0le/
mindecl-e.pdf.
85. I conducted fifteen formal interviews for this section in 2001, as well as a number of less for-
mal, "conversational" interviews with unionists, workers, journalists, businessmen, government
officials, and others. I chose the interviewees based on influence, representativeness, and diversity
of institutional affiliation. The small sample size means that none of the results of these interviews
should be considered statistically informative on any particular issue. Rather, my goal was to
gather a range of ideas and opinions on the workers' rights clause that would help me understand
the issues from the point of view of Indian actors.
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it is important to note that I do not attempt to describe every argument, legiti-
mate or not, that might be raised in opposition to a workers' rights clause. My
goal, rather, is to highlight and categorize those arguments that arise most fre-
quently within the Indian context.
Arguments used against the workers' rights clause within the Indian debate
can be categorized broadly into three categories: economic, political, and struc-
tural.86 In my typology, an economic argument is one that critiques a workers'
rights clause based on its economic impact on the Indian economy. A political ar-
gument addresses the proper balance between domestic and international regula-
tory jurisdiction, as well as ideological and philosophical approaches to economic
organization. A structural argument addresses questions such as the legal and
strategic effectiveness and appropriateness of using particular institutions and
mechanisms to protect workers' rights.
1. Economic Arguments
The most commonly articulated argument is an economic one, i.e., that a
workers' rights clause will have the effect of reducing trade and, as a result, em-
ployment. Moreover, it is argued, the subjective intent of Western parties is not
necessarily to better the lot of Indian workers, but rather to protect domestic in-
dustry and jobs. Protectionism is probably the central issue for the government
and employers and one of the most important issues to unions and workers'
rights advocates.8
7
a. Protectionism in Current Context
The belief that protectionism motivated Western moves for a social clause
was prevalent among India's trade unions, including both the central unions
86. Two scholars have attempted to analyze arguments by Indian opposition to linkage, focus-
ing primarily on union opposition. Gerda van Roozendaal has analyzed the Indian union govern-
mental opposition to a workers' rights clause, citing: (1) distrust of Western "motives"; (2) the lack
of compatibility between international standards and India's level of development; (3) the lack of
effectiveness of a social clause; and (4) sovereignty claims. See VAN ROOZENDAAL,supra note 47, at
124-26. Rohini Hensman, a Mumbai-based scholar, has argued that the opposition by unions and
the Left to the workers' rights clause is rooted in (1) opposition to "globalization" often based on
economic and cultural nationalism; (2) opposition to the WTO as an institution; (3) the belief that
labor standards are not related to trade and that the West will use these in a protectionist manner
that violates national sovereignty; and (4) concerns about how a workers' rights clause might be
implemented. See Rohini Hensman, World Trade and Workers' Rights: In Search ofan International-
ist Position, 33 ANTIPODE 427 (2001).
87. See VAN ROOzENDAAL,supra note 47, at 124; Hensman, supra note 86, at 427.
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that are affiliated with political parties, and the independent ones that operate
without affiliation.88 P K. Ganguly, a leader of the communist Centre of Indian
Trade Unions (CITU), sums it up succinctly: "[T]he attempt to include Ia] social
clause in multilateral trade is essentially to introduce unilateral non-tariff
protectionist barriers to multi-lateral trade."89 The General Secretary of CITU,
M. K. Pandhe, reaffirmed this view in an interview noting,
A social clause will not get us a better price for our products. What
you will find is all the advanced countries have their trade blocks
in the WTO. These trade blocks are there to promote their own
economies. They are developing a policy of protectionism, while
in the developing countries we are competing with each other.90
INTUC, the politically-centered union aligned with the Congress Party,
noted in its document "Trade Union Movement in the New Millennium," that
"It]he developed countries ... indulge in protectionism of their self-interests in
the name of fixation [on] labour standards, child labour, human rights, environ-
mental concerns, etc., unilaterally to hit the labour-intensive and traditional sec-
tors of developing countries and thus deprive the livelihood of the masses. '
The government also relies heavily on the protectionist claim in its opposi-
tion to a workers' rights clause.92 The Delhi Declaration, quoted above, is one
88. India's trade union movement is dominated by five major trade union centers. These central
trade unions are constituted by smaller unions, often plant or worksite based, that are affiliated
with the trade union center. The trade union centers are also, with one major exception, affili-
ated or closely associated with political parties. INTUC, for example, has traditionally been affil-
iated with the Congress Party. The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) is aligned with the
Bharatiya Janta Parishad (BJP), while the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) is affiliated
with the Communist Party of India (CPI), and the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) is affil-
iated with the CPI (Marxist-Leninist). The Hind Mazdoor Sabah (HMS) has traditionally been
nonaligned, although it has a generally democratic socialist bend and, like INTUC, is a member
of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Smaller independent unions not affili-
ated to parties or trade union centers exist throughout the country, but they are particularly con-
centrated in Mumbai.
89. P. K. Ganguly, Labour Rights and National Interests, in LABOUR, ENVIRONMENT AND GLOBAL-
ISATION,supra note 61, at 40, 42.
90. Interview with M. K. Pandhe, Gen. Sec'y, Ctr. of Indian Trade Unions, in New Delhi, India
(Aug. 2, 2001).
91. INDIAN NAT'L TRADE UNION CONG.,supra note 45, at 3 (2000).
92. See VAN ROOZENDAAL, supra note 47, at 127.
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expression of this;93 while the government's Ministry of Commerce, in its online
newsletter, has written:
India's position along with that of many developing countries has
been that it is fully committed to the observance of labour rights
and promotion of labour welfare through its domestic policies.
However, the issue of labour standards at the international level
can be appropriately addressed only in the ILO and not in the
WTO. The use of trade measures to enforce labour standards is a
protectionist device and has to be rejected.94
Employers also highlight protectionism as a core concern. As the owner of
one of Bangalore's largest apparel manufacturers told me, employers largely see
the social clause as a "discriminatory tool,"95 and believe that developed coun-
tries primarily wish to protect their own industries.96
Even those who support a social clause, or at least advocate exploring the is-
sue, are skeptical of the West's motivations. Sujata Gothaskar, a Bombay trade-
union activist who does not oppose a workers' rights clause, claimed that "none
of us feel that the Western unions are particularly concerned with child labor;
just that they are protectionist. 97
India has good reason to be suspicious of the U.S. and Western govern-
ments' motives. Indeed, eliminating the rampant protectionism that marked the
trading system was the primary reason why a system of international trade gov-
ernance came into existence. In what scholars Robert Howse and Michael
Trebilcock refer to as the "New Protectionism,"98 developed countries increas-
ingly imposed nontariff barriers to trade through, inter alia, countervailing du-
ties, quotas, and voluntary export restraint agreements in order to protect
domestic industries against the economic threat of the newly industrialized
93. See sources cited supra note 65 and accompanying text.
94. Labour Standards - The Social Clatue, INDIA & THE WTO (Gov't of India Ministry of Com-
merce, New Delhi, India), Sept. 1999, at 6, http://commerce.nic.in/wto-sep.pdf.
95. Interview with Sumeer Hinduja, Group Dir.-Human Res., Gokaldas Images, in Banga-
lore, India (July 29, 2001).
96. Interview with Jagdish Hinduja, Managing Dir., Gokaldas Images, in Bangalore, India
(July 29,2001).
97. Interview with Sujata Gothaskar, Trade Union Activist, in Mumbai, India (Aug. 17,2001).
98. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HowsE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 21 (2d
ed. 1999).
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countries.99 An example of this is the now-expired Multi-Fiber Arrangement
(MFA), l00 which had permitted developed countries to place quotas on the im-
port of textiles and apparel. The allowance of quotas was an exception to the
GATT's general prohibition against quotas.1"' Western countries were granted
the ability to negotiate bilateral agreements imposing specific quotas for differ-
ent kinds of garments and apparel. 0 2 Industries and workers in those industries
gladly supported these moves in order to protect their businesses and jobs.
b. Protectionism in Historical Context
The presumption that linkage is motivated by protectionist intent is also
historically rooted in India's economic and colonial history. Exploring this his-
tory will help elucidate the issues facing contemporary scholars and decision-
makers and perhaps shed light on the roots of opposition by other developing
countries that share similar colonial histories.
Scholars of Indian labor and economic history often note that Indian labor
legislation has its genesis in a colonial-era set of laws originally advocated for by
British textile interests. Ajit Roy, for example, points to one of the original pieces
of labor legislation as an exercise in protecting British textile mills in England.0 3
Roy claims that while the Indian Factories Act of 1881 was ostensibly enacted by
the British in order to guarantee minimum working conditions for workers in
the textile mills of Bombay, the real impetus behind the law was to protect Brit-
ish mills from cheap imports. 4 Economic historian Dietmar Rothermund sup-
ports this view, writing that "[tihis act was not passed for philanthropic reasons,




100. Agreement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001, 930
U.N.T.S. 162.
101. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-11,55 U.N.T.S. 194.
102. The MFA, which expired on January 1, 2005, was replaced by the Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing. The latter called for the end of quotas on clothing and textiles as of January 1, 2005.
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While Rothermund and Roy are willing to ascribe a singular causality and
motivation behind the passage of the law, some historians argue that, although
there was indeed pressure for the creation of labor law legislation from British
textile interests, there was a multiplicity of constituencies with a variety of inter-
ests supporting passage of the labor law. Prominent among these were English
and Indian philanthropists who were particularly concerned with the welfare of
child and female workers. 6
Interest in these issues by social reformers was further fueled in 1873, when
the Bombay government issued its Administrative Report for 1872-73, in which
it brought to public attention the long working hours of Bombay textile and cot-
ton workers, focusing particularly on child and women's labor.1 7 What resulted
was the 1881 Factories Act, but it provided only limited workplace regulations
that focused on child and women workers.
The passage of this law, however, provided Indian factory workers inspira-
tion to organize for better working conditions and for labor legislation more far-
reaching than the 1881 law. Between 1882 and 1890, several strikes took place
around the country out of which was created the Bombay Millhands Association
under the leadership of N. M. Lokhande' ° One of Lokhande's primary objec-
tives was to improve the 1881 legislation by including provisions for a weekly
holiday, a "noontide" recess, limitation of working hours, prohibition of undue
delay in payment of wages, and compensation for accidents."°9 In a strange align-
ment of interests between Indian unions and British manufacturers, the
Manchester Chamber of Commerce also agitated for passage of a stricter law, al-
beit for protectionist reasons."' What resulted, in 1891, was an amended law
that provided for more rigorous working-hour protections, a weekly holiday,
and a grant of power to local governments to make health and safety regula-
tions."' Even after the passage of the 1891 Factories Act, agitations for more ex-
tensive working-hour regulations continued by Indian workers and by British
106. See RAJANI KANTA DAS, HISTORY OF INDIAN LABOUR LEGISLATION 52 (1941); SUKOMAL SEN,
WORKING CLASS OF INDIA 46 (2d ed. 1993).
107. See G. RAMANUJAM, INDIAN LABOUR MOVEMENT 7 (1986).
108. See id. at 8.
109. T. R. BHASIN, EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES OF LABOUR LEGISLATION, AND POLICY IN INDIA
1850 TO 1956, at 5-6 (1957).
110. DAS,supra note 106, at 53.
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workers who supported them."12 In 1911, advocates succeeded in gaining pas-
sage of a newly amended act that reduced hours for all workers."
13
This brief look at the evolution of one piece of colonial-era Indian labor leg-
islation illustrates that, while Indian stakeholders have historical justification to
be skeptical of laws that were generated, at least in part, in order to satisfy protec-
tionist constituencies, it is important to point out that the generative processes of
these laws were not necessarily one-dimensional. While British mill owners cer-
tainly had, and British workers might and probably did have, protectionist moti-
vations, their interests seemed to align with the professed interests of Indian
workers who were agitating for the same in India."4 In sum, as scholars such as
Rohini Hensman have noted, concerns that the motivations of some actors might
be purely self-interested should not obscure the core issues of whether the legisla-
tion is desirable.' Indeed, involvement in the crafting of those measures might be
the best way to ensure that they are designed to minimize protectionist elements
that are not in the interest of the workers that the measures are designed to protect.
2. Political Arguments
The second category of arguments against a workers' rights clause is politi-
cal. Political arguments in India can be subdivided into two types of claims. The
first is a sovereignty claim that reflects a concern about the degree to which India
maintains control over its own regulatory and governance processes free from
foreign international coercion." 6 In this model, a workers' rights clause consti-
tutes an unacceptable infringement upon India's right to autonomy and self-
governance because it would circumscribe India's regulatory sovereignty. For
example, one factory owner told me that labor conditions are "a process that a
country has to undertake itself, not through conditions," indicating a shared op-
position to the external imposition of regulation and trade conditionality. 17
a. Contemporary Political Aiguments
Sovereignty concerns are expressed across stakeholder lines, including by
the government, employers, unions, and labor activists. Some of these claims are
112. Id. at 55.
113. ALl AMJAD, LABOUR LEGISLATION AND TRADE UNIONS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 31 (2001).
114. See V. Vivekanandan, Outright Rejection or Strategic Use?, in LABOUR, ENVIRONMENT AND
GLOBALISATION, supra note 61, at 143, 150-54; Hensman,supra note 86, at 437.
115. See Hensman,supra note 86, at 437.
116. See id. at 430; VAN ROOZENDAAL,SUpra note 47, at 125-26, 127-28.
117. Interview with Jagdish Hinduja, supra note 96.
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based in nationalism, although a union leader from the CITU, one of the two
Communist central trade unions, was careful to note that legitimate sovereignty
concerns were to be differentiated from what he described as illegitimate sover-
eignty claims, such as cultural- and ethnic-based nationalism."'
The second political claim is aperse opposition to globalization " 9 and to the
international Financial institutions with which it is associated, such as the
WTO 1 21 While India's economic liberalization is often portrayed as a phenom-
enon receiving widespread support among all of India's citizens, there are in fact
many segments of Indian civil society that are highly skeptical of its implica-
tions. According to this point of view, a workers' rights clause in the WTO
should be opposed on principle because to accept a workers' rights clause would
be to implicitly accept the legitimacy of the WTO, as well as the other interna-
tional financial institutions and their projects. As N. Vasudevan, leader of an in-
dependent union in Mumbai, explains, "[b]ehind the idea of a social clause there
is a deep rooted conspiracy aimed at associating trade unions and workers['] or-
ganisations into the implementation of structural adjustment plans."''2 He adds,
"The rule of international capital is now organised through the... IMF, World
Bank and WTO. They stand as the three great pillars of global control."' 22
The left unions are, not surprisingly, the most prominent adherents to the
antiglobalization position. For example, CITU's Maharashtra Secretary Gen-
eral, Vivek Monteiro, told me:
[W]e don't see the WTO as an impartial body; it's a highly politi-
cal body and there is a definite agenda behind that. It represents
interests of big corporate capitalism. We don't see anything to be
gained by labor standards to be operated by a body that is essen-
tially a tool of corporate capitalism. 23
118. Interview with Vivek Monteiro, Maharashtra Sec'y Gen., Ctr. of Indian Trade Unions,
Mumbai, India (July 20, 2001).
119. I use the term globalization in a basic economic sense, and follow Rohini Hensman who de-
fines it as "the increasing integration of national economies into the world economy through the re-
moval of barriers to international trade and capital movements." Hensman,supra note 86, at 428.
120. See VAN ROOZENDAAL,supra note 47, at 124 (arguing that unions question the motives of the
WTO); Hensman, supra note 86, at 429-30.
121. N. Vasudevan, Workers Should Demand Abrogation of WTO, in LABOUR, ENVIRONMENT AND
GLOBALISATION,supra note 61, at 66, 68.
122. Id. at 67.
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The All Indian Trade Union Congress (AITUC), the other communist af-
filiated union, is also clear in its belief that the WTO is little more than a mani-
festation and agent of capitalists and multinationals. H. Mahadevan, AITUC
Deputy General Secretary, describes the WTO as "the culmination of a 25-year-
long process of forging a new global economy by transnational corporations and
banks" and a "totalitarian inter-governmental body."'
' 24
It is not only the left, however, that is opposed to the WTO and globaliza-
tion. The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sabha (BMS) is a labor union that is founded on
Hindu nationalist principles and that opposes both communism and foreign
multinationals. The BMS, like the communist and left unions, has taken a hard-
line stance against globalization despite the efforts of its associated political
party, the Bharatiya Janta Parishad (BJP), to liberalize Indian markets while it
was in power.25 Lakshma Reddy, National Secretary of the BMS, told me,
"What they say is one country, one world. But in our experience it is about the
exploitation of developing countries.... That is why BMS has opposed [global-
ization and the WTO] from the beginning."'126
The central trade unions, however, have not been completely uniform in
their opposition to globalization. Chandidas Sinha, Secretary of INTUC, said in
an interview that INTUC supports trade, 27 while in its literature INTUC em-
phasizes that liberalization needs to be accompanied by strong domestic gover-
nance that ensures union and worker participation. 28
b. The Neocolonialism of the Social Clause
When K. L. Mahendra, Secretary of AITUC and a prominent unionist,
writes that "[tihe trade unions are ... conscious that the developing countries
have not come out of the colonial past," 129 we are reminded that the anti-social-
clause political arguments are situated within the context of India's colonial ex-
perience. For some stakeholders, ranging politically from left to right, globaliza-
124. H. Mahadevan, Speech at the Open World Conference of Labor (Feb. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.owcinfo.org/owcnews/owcnews29.htm.
125. The BJP held power over the governing coalition from 1996 through 2004.
126. Interview with Lakshma Reddy, Nat'l Sec'y, Bharatiya Mazdoor Sabha, in New Delhi,
India (Aug. 2, 2001).
127. Interview with Chandidas Sinha, Sec'y, Indian Nat'l Trade Union Cong., New Delhi, India
(Aug. 2, 2001).
128. INDIAN NAT'L TRADE UNION CONG.,supra note 45, at 22-23 (2000).
129. See K. L. Mahendra, The All India Trade Union Congress' Position, in LABOUR, ENVIRONMENT
AND GLOBALISATION, SUpra note 61, at 44, 44.
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tion and the WTO are viewed as engines of Western interests that impose
externally dictated financial and political governance.
For example, in a pamphlet entitled "WTO: Moro, Toro, Choro" (WTO:
Bend it, Break it, Leave it), BMS founder and right-wing nationalist leader,
Datopan Thengri, opposes the WTO and globalization as an encroachment on
Indian sovereignty, self-governance, and Hindu culture, and writes with dra-
matic flourish:
Today a profound and deep challenge is before us. Our country,
chained in financial slavery, is being constrained and ... pulled
tightly.... The reality is that the current manners of conducting
our efforts, agriculture, education, research, every jurisdiction is
going into the hands of foreigners.... [Tihe country will be de-
stroyed. [S]uch a mood has developed that whatever commodity,
opinion, or institution is considered best, is from the West.
... These very notions have entered our veins much like those of
the intellectuals (rationalists) .... [T]his mentality has spread into
the entire country's life.
130
Accusations of a neocolonial agenda and mentality were also made toward
the Seattle protestors, workers'-rights-clause advocates, and NGOs, who were
sometimes compared to the colonial rulers. One commentator, for example,
wrote in a major Indian newspaper:
In sum, they are a new breed of self-righteous imperialists bearing
a new White Man's Burden. They have sympathizers in develop-
ing countries, just as British imperialists did. Like the old White
Man's Burden, the new one also includes some laudable ideals.
The question is whether these ideals should be shoved down the
throats of poor countries or promoted through persuasion and
compensation for the costs they impose .. .'31
130. Pamphlet from Dattopan Thengri, Bharatiya Mazdur Sabha Founder (April 2001) (my
translation).
131. Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, India's Comparative Advantage in Agitators, TIMES OF IN-
DIA, Dec. 19, 1999.
INDIA'S OPPOSITION TO THE WORKERS' RIGHTS CLAUSE 253
Some commentators have also suggested that Western NGOs and unions
supporting a workers' rights clause often universalize their claims without in-
corporating the viewpoints of, or consulting with, developing world labor activ-
ists or NGOs. 3 2 Shankar Gopal argues that this was evidenced in Seattle, where
Western NGOs and unions made minimal efforts to coordinate or understand
the needs and demands of third world actors in formulating their agendas or
strategies. 3 ' Mark Anner supports this analysis, arguing that the ICFTU's failed
campaign to incorporate a workers' rights clause into the WTO at the Seattle
round was due in part to an insufficient effort to incorporate Southern voices in
forming the ICFTU's policy and campaign.134 This sentiment was further echoed
in comments made by Gautam Mody, director of the Centre for Workers' Man-
agement in New Delhi, who noted that Indian unions were angered by the
ICFTU's approach at trying to rally support for the social clause in 1996. '3 Ac-
cording to Mody, Bill Jordan came to meetings with union leaders to tell them
what he and the ICFTU were going to do and get their support for it,3 6 without
discussing what might be the approach most amenable to Indian unions.
13 7
3. Structural Arguments
A third category of anti-social-clause arguments is structural.'3 8 These argu-
ments concern, inter alia, the proper institutional capacities and roles of the ILO
and WTO; the effectiveness and appropriateness of sanctions as an enforcement
mechanism in a workers' rights clause; and the way in which different actors
would be involved in the processes of implementing a workers' rights clause.
The first structural claim concerns the proper institutional capacities and
roles of the ILO and WTO. First, social clause skeptics claim that the ILO has
the most institutional expertise in labor issues, and it is therefore best situated to
address them. Yet proponents of this view, such as Vasant Gupte, Director of the
132. See Shankar Gopal,American Anti-Globalization Movement: Re-examining Seattle Protests, 36
EcoN. & POL. WKLY. 3226, 3230 (2001).
133. Id.
134. See Mark Anner, The International Trade Union Campaign for Core Labor Standards in the
WTO, WORKINC USA, Jul. 31, 2001, at 43.
135. Gautam Mody, Comments at the Conference on Globalization, Labor and South Asian
Communities (Nov. 11, 2001).
136. See Dasgupta, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
137. Mody,supra note 135.
138. Rohini Hensman has described some of these arguments as questions of "implementation."
Hensman,supra note 86, at 442.
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Maniben Kariba Institute, also acknowledge that the "ILO should have stronger
teeth and the will to bite." ' 9 Second is the belief, raised primarily by unionists
and labor rights advocates, that the WTO is ill-suited to address labor issues be-
cause it is an organization of governments with no representation of civil soci-
ety. 4' In support of this, adherents of this view emphasize the fact that unions
have no standing to bring complaints to the Dispute Settlement Body. Further,
because governments, it is argued, are highly unlikely to lodge a complaint on
behalf of workers, the WTO would therefore be largely ineffective as a forum
because workers' issues simply would not be raised. The third institutional ca-
pacity argument posits that the WTO has already exceeded its mandate and that
adding labor rights to the WTO's responsibilities would only exacerbate this
problem. This argument is primarily articulated by the Indian government,
which is particularly concerned that by allowing labor standards to become part
of the WTO's mandate, the flood doors would open to other issues that the de-
veloping countries believe ought to stay off the table, such as investment and in-
tellectual property issues.'41
The second structural argument questions the use of trade sanctions as an
appropriate and effective enforcement tool. 14 2 Labor and human rights advo-
cates have been particularly keen on the WTO as a forum for linkage, in part be-
cause of the economic coercion that the WTO system can facilitate through its
capacity to regulate and adjudicate the basis upon which contracting members
may discriminate against other contracting members, including based on labor
rights criteria. The role of sanction in the debate is reflected by Subramanian
Swamy when he writes,
[Tjhe basic dilemma is that any provision for trade sanctions will
meet strong opposition from developing countries because it
threatens comparative advantage, while any clause that does not
include trade sanctions will not add much to the urgency to cor-
rect the default in labour standards, and therefore not be credible
to those advocating [for the] Social Clause. 143
139. Interview with Vasant Gupte, Dir., Maniben Kariba Inst., in Mumbai, India (July 16,2001).
140. Id.
141. See VAN ROOZENDAAL, SUpra note 47, at 128.
142. Hensman,supra note 86, at 431-32.
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First, as Bennet D'Acosta, General Secretary of the Hindustan Lever
Union, has stated, a sanctions regime risks harming the people whom it purports
to help.' This is a version of the argument, put forward by some economists,
that sanctions would only decrease the aggregate welfare of workers and harm
the people whom a workers' rights clause was intended to benefit.' 45 Second,
there is a concern that in a WTO sanctions regime, sanctions are insufficiently
tailored to punish the actual violators of workers' rights and reward those facto-
ries that respect workers' rights.4 6 Because sanctions in a WTO-based workers'
rights regime would likely be commodity-based and applied industry wide, and
not be factory specific, trade measures are too blunt a tool. 14 7 Thus, even factories
in a given industry that respect workers' rights would potentially suffer from
sanctions imposed by an importing country. Finally, interviewees expressed con-
cern that wealthy countries would wield more power in a sanctions regime be-
cause exports to the United States from India are more significant to the Indian
economy than U.S. exports to India are to the U.S. economy.
A third category of structural arguments challenges the effectiveness of a
workers rights' clause in the Indian context. It is estimated that a high percent-
age of employment is in the informal, or what in India is often termed the unor-
ganized, sector. 1' This sector primarily produces for the domestic market.
Moreover, it has been estimated that only about 10 million workers produce for
the export sector altogether in India, although that might double by 2010.'49 Be-
cause a workers' rights clause would only apply to products made for export, it
would impact only a relatively small segment of the Indian workforce and
144. Interview with Bennet D'Acosta, Gen. Sec'y, Hindustan Lever Union, in Mumbai, India
(July 17, 2001).
145. See Stern, supra note 32.
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22 § 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1239 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/dispu.e/dsue.htm.
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and Time 9 (World Bank, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0119, 2001), http://
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therefore would not have a significant impact on the vast majority of Indian
workers.'
50
The final category of structural arguments might be termed "compatibility"
issues. This argument cuts to the heart of the International Labor Standards de-
bate and questions whether it is equitable and appropriate to apply a uniform set
of standards to countries of differing levels of economic development. 15' Of par-
ticular concern is the special attention given to child labor by the West. 152 The
question of how to address child labor in India is a controversial one. While
some argue that child labor would be solved through development and increases
in aggregate wealth, others, notably Myron Weiner, have argued that the child
labor question is a matter of political will, rather than one of economics, and that
child labor only exists in India because of a lack of will of the middle class to stop
it. 53 Whatever the policy perspective, many stakeholders in India believe that
Western countries would use child labor as the justification to impose sanctions.
In this section I have broadly outlined the arguments raised by Indian stake-
holders in the workers'-rights-clause debate, and have put forward a simple typol-
ogy to aid scholars and advocates in thinking about what issues need to be
addressed. I have not attempted to list every argument for or against trade and labor
linkage, but rather have attempted to focus on the ones that are most prevalent.
III. A NEW POLITICS OF LINKAGE?
To move beyond stalemate on the linkage issue, advocates and scholars must
engage more dynamically with the economic, political, and structural objections
of stakeholders in the developing world. First, they must focus on reducing the
perceived and actual presence of protectionist intent and effect. To that end,
clarity about which labor standards or rights would constitute the labor stan-
dards mandate is vital, and would help mitigate the concerns that the workers'
rights clause is a protectionist attempt to drive up wages and injure India's com-
petitive advantage. Second, political concerns need to be taken into account,
and an approach adopted that privileges domestic regulatory control, multi-
150. See, e.g., Hensman,supra note 86, at 441.
151. Interview with Chandidas Sinha, supra note 127; Hensman,supra note 86, at 437.
152. "None of us feel that Western unions are particularly concerned with child labor, just that
they are protectionist." Interview with Sujata Gothaskar,supra note 97.
153. See MYRON WEINER, THE CHILD AND THE STATE IN INDIA: CHILD LABOR AND EDUCATION POL-
ICY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 5-6 (1991).
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stakeholder participation, and transparency. There needs to be recognition of
the tenor and amplitude of skepticism by some stakeholders about globalization,
and an understanding of the colonial frame within which the linkage issue is
seen by many countries. Careful stock must also be taken of the proper institu-
tional roles of the WTO and the ILO, for the question as to whether interna-
tional labor governance ought to fall within the domain of international
financial institutions or international labor institutions is not a trivial one. Fi-
nally, the fixation, by some, with the sanctions power of the WTO needs to be re-
considered, for, as we have seen, it is highly problematic both on a practical and
symbolic level to many in the developing world.
Where, then, does that leave the trade linkage debate? There is little chance
of legislative linkage, in the form of a workers' rights clause, occurring in the
WTO anytime in the foreseeable future. The Singapore Declaration, reaffirmed
at Doha, together with the defeat of any inclusion whatsoever of discussion of the
issue at Seattle, has made this clear. Some might still hope that a judicial approach
in the WTO is the best opportunity to link the international trade system with
labor rights protections. But a judicial approach requires that a country imple-
ment a law limiting imports of a product made in a manner that violates workers'
rights. If such a labor-related trade measure were to survive a challenge in the
WTO, it would be dependent on the interpretive stance of a Dispute Settlement
Body that might be composed of the workers' rights skeptics that are part of what
Howse has described as an "insider network" ideologically committed to free
trade and intuitively opposed to regulation protecting foreign workers. 54
Bilateral and regional agreements perhaps hold the most promise. The ad-
vantage of bilateral and regional agreements is that they are negotiated in con-
text-specific situations and have the consent of signatory countries. But, in recent
years, the provisions in bilateral agreements have become less rigorous;5 5 and
apart from NAALC, at the time of this writing there has yet to be any actual use
of their remedies for labor rights enforcement. 156 In addition, although bypass-
ing the WTO, most of the labor rights provision formulations in these agree-
ments have followed the violation-complaint-sanctions model of which many
developing countries are wary.
154. Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy--and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral
Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 104-05 (2002).
155. See GREVEN, Supra note 29, at 30-31.
156. See id. at 27 (noting that the remedial mechanisms are "as of yet untested" in agreements
such as the Jordan agreement).
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While it is beyond the scope of this paper to detail an alternative path for
new labor rights approaches in bilateral trade agreements, I propose a few
guidelines for a new way forward that takes stock of the new politics of linkage.
First, there should be a move away from a sanctions model toward an incentives
model. Thus, tariff reductions might be the carrot in return for verified compli-
ance with international labor standards. '57 Second, labor rights enforcement is
no longer purely the domain of state-centered law. Informal and non-state-
centered regulation, such as corporate codes of conduct and transparent moni-
toring by NGOs, have become a new form of enforcing labor rights in which a
market for labor-standard-compliant products plays a role, in addition to more
traditional state-focused legal approaches, in promoting respect for labor
rights.' 8 Trade and labor linkage regimes can utilize these tools of enforcement
if integrated creatively, as they have been done, as I describe below, in Cambo-
dia. By focusing on non-state-oriented approaches, some of the political con-
cerns that I have described above might be mitigated. Third, the ILO ought to
play a prominent role in the new linkage regimes. We have seen that the ILO is
viewed as a trusted and neutral organization by many stakeholders in the devel-
oping world. The role of the ILO remains to be determined and is dependent on
the specific context in which the ILO is working. It could act, for example, as a
neutral arbiter of labor rights compliance in the tariffs-incentive regime in point
one. Or, it could be a trusted monitor of violations at the factory level, generating
information for the social market for standards as described in point two.'59
Some of these approaches have already been experimented with in a bilat-
eral textile agreement that was in effect between the United States and Cambo-
dia between 1999 and 2004.'" This agreement provided an incentive, by means
of quota allowance, for the Cambodian garment industry to be in compliance
157. This tariffs incentives proposal has been put forward by Human Rights Watch. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE: EL SALVADOR'S FAILURE TO PROTECT WORKERS' RIGHTS
95-96 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/elsalvadorl203/elsalvadorl203.pdf.
158. See, e.g., Dara O'Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of
Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 1 (2003).
159. See SANDRA POLASKI, CAMBODIA BLAZES A NEW PATH TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND JOB CRE-
ATION 10 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Carnegie Papers No. 51, 2004); Kolben, supra note
27, at 81-82.
160. Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-made Fiber, Non-Cotton Vegetable
Fiber and Silk Blend Textiles and Textile Products Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Royal Government of Cambodia, U.S.-Cambodia, Jan. 29, 1999, http://
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with Cambodian and international labor law. To determine if the industry was
in compliance, the ILO was contracted to monitor Cambodia's garment facto-
ries and make public the results of their findings.'61 Buyers would evaluate com-
panies and make sourcing decisions based in part on the information generated
by the ILO. Indeed, some would not do business in a factory that had not been
inspected. What was particularly novel about this model was that it combined a
state-focused, public law approach of a trade agreement, with a mechanism that
generated information for the market for labor rights-compliant garments. 162
The project was so successful in the view of Cambodia's government, unions,
and garment manufacturers that it has garnered funding from the World Bank
to continue a monitoring initiative as a means of improving its competitive ad-
vantage after the MFA.163
Whatever the particular forms international labor rights regulation and
trade and labor linkage will take in the future, the new politics of linkage re-
quires a new interaction and engagement with the objections raised by develop-
ing countries in the workers' rights clause debate. Otherwise, scholars and
advocates will continue to reinvent the wheel"6 and move nowhere.
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